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Abstract
Social Media are nowadays the privileged channel for information spread-
ing and news checking. Unexpectedly for most of the users, automated
accounts, also known as social bots, contribute more and more to this
process of news spreading. Using Twitter as a benchmark, we consider
the traffic exchanged, over one month of observation, on a specific topic,
namely the migration flux from Northern Africa to Italy. We measure
the significant traffic of tweets only, by implementing an entropy-based
null model that discounts the activity of users and the virality of tweets.
Results show that social bots play a central role in the exchange of signif-
icant content. Indeed, not only the strongest hubs have a number of bots
among their followers higher than expected, but furthermore a group of
them, that can be assigned to the same political tendency, share a com-
mon set of bots as followers. The retwitting activity of such automated
accounts amplifies the presence on the platform of the hubs’ messages.
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1 Introduction
According to Global Digital Report, in 2018, “more than 3 billion people around
the world now use social media each month”1. Even traditional newspapers and
news agencies moved to social networks, to cope with this societal change.
Since a decade microblogging platforms, like Twitter, have become promi-
nent sources of information [1], catching breaking news and anticipating more
traditional media like radio and television [2].
Helped by the simple activity consisting of creating a text of 140 (now 280)
characters, on Twitter we assist to the proliferation of social accounts governed
- completely or in part - by pieces of software that automatically create, share,
and like contents on the platform. Such software, also known as social bots -
or simply bots - can be programmed to automatically post information about
news of any kind and even to provide help during emergencies. As amplifiers
of messages, bots can simply be considered as a mere technological instrument.
Unfortunately, the online ecosystem is constantly threatened by malicious au-
tomated accounts, recently deemed responsible for tampering with online dis-
cussions about major political election in western countries, including the 2016
US presidential elections, and the UK Brexit referendum [3–6]. Recent work
demonstrates that automated accounts are particularly efficient in spreading
low credibility content and amplifying their visibility [7]. They also target influ-
ential people, bombarding them with hateful contents [8], and they even interact
with users according to their political opinion [9]. Bots’ actions do not spare
financial markets: as much as 71% of the authors of suspicious tweets about
US stocks have been classified as bots by a state-of-the-art spambot detection
algorithm [10].
Estimates conducted on Twitter report that, on average, social bots account
for 9% to 15% of total active platform users [11]. This notable percentage is
highly due to the crucial issue that automated accounts evolve over time: in
a large-scale experiment, it has been proved that neither Twitter admins, nor
tech-savvy social media users, nor cutting-edge applications were able to tell
apart evolving bots and legitimate users [12].
Academicians make their best efforts to fight the never ending plague of
malicious bots populating social networks. The literature offers a plethora of
successful approaches, based, e.g., on profile- [13, 14], network- [15–17], and
posting-characteristics [18–20] of the accounts. In particular, the supervised
approach proposed in [13] tested a series of rules and features from both the
grey literature and the official publications on a reference dataset of genuine and
fake accounts, leading to the implementation of a classifier which significantly
reduces the cost for data gathering. Propensity to fall into disinformation has
been recently measured in US [9, 21], while other work studies the different
interactions among users and automated accounts [8, 11,22].
During last years, entropy-based null-models for the analysis of complex net-
works [23,24] have demonstrated their effectiveness in reconstructing a network
1https://digitalreport.wearesocial.com
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from partial information [25], in detecting early signals of structural changes [26,
27] and in assessing the systemic risk of a financial system [28,29]. The approach
is general and unbiased, being based on the concept of Shannon entropy. In a
nutshell, starting from the real network, the method relies on three steps: 1.
the definition of an ensemble of graphs; 2. the definition of the entropy for this
ensemble and its maximization up to some (local or global) constraints [30]; 3.
the maximization of the likelihood of the real network [31,32]. Recently, such a
framework has been applied to the traffic of messages on Twitter during the 2018
Italian election campaign [33] and it has permitted to infer political standings
directly from data. Moreover, the analysis of the exchanged messages showed
a signal of communication between opposite political forces during the election
campaign, which anticipated an unexpected post-elections political agreement.
In the present paper, we merge the application of the lightweight classifier
for bot detection in [13] with the analysis of complex networks via entropy-based
null-models. Once we have cleaned the system from the random noise via the
application of the null-model, we study the effects of social bots in retwitting
a significant amount of messages on Twitter, without entering in the highly
sensitive matter of the veridicity of the messages exchanged. We apply this
analysis to a tweet corpus concerned with the Italian political propaganda about
migration in the Mediterranean Sea from Africa to Italy through Lybian ports.
We select tweets according to the presence of specific keywords and analyse the
network of messages and the related accounts across one month period. We
measure that the most effective hubs in the considered network have a number
of bots followers higher than average.
In this manuscript, we also find out that a group of successful accounts
(hubs), whose owners share similar political views, do share a relatively high
number of bots. It appears that the hubs and their bot squads join together, to
increase the visibility of the hubs messages.
2 Results
2.1 Data collection and processing
Our study is based on a large corpus of Twitter data, generated by collecting
tweets about migrations, and focusing on the case of Lybia-Italy flows. For the
data collection operations, we developed a crawler based on Twitter public Fil-
ter API2, which provides real-time tweet delivery, filtered according to specified
keywords. We selected a set of keywords compatible with recent chronicles. Ta-
ble 1 lists the selected keywords. The filtering procedure was not case-sensitive.
The keywords have been selected because they are commonly used in Italy when
talking and writing about immigration flows from North Africa to the Italian
2https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/filter-realtime/api-reference/
post-statuses-filter.html
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Keywords
immigrati immigrants
migranti migrants
ong ngo
scafisti boat drivers as human smugglers
seawatch a ngo operating in the Mediterranean Sea
barconi barges/boats
clandestini illegal immigrants
guardia costiera libica Lybian coast guard
naufragio shipwreck
sbarco disembarkation
Table 1: Keywords used for collecting tweets concerned with Lybia-Italy migra-
tions. Keywords have been searched in Italian, the English translation is on the
right.
coasts and about the dispute about the holder of jurisdiction for handling emer-
gencies, involving European countries and NGOs3.
We collected 1,082,029 tweets, posted by 127,275 unique account IDs, over
a period of one month (from January 2019, 23rd to February 2019, 22nd).
By relying on the technique introduced in [13] and recapped in the Methods
section, all the accounts have been classified either as genuine or as bots. This
classification led to 117,879 genuine accounts and 9,396 social bots. All collected
tweets were stored in Elasticsearch4 for fast and efficient retrieval.
Twitter has the possibility (upon request of the account owner) to give an
official certification about the account’s ‘authenticity’. The procedure is mostly
adopted by VIPs, official political parties, newspapers, radios and TV channels,
in order to reduce interference of fake users. As a result, Twitter users can thus
be divided in two sets, the verified and unverified ones5.
2.2 User polarization
Here, we consider the bipartite network of verified and unverified users in which
links represent an interaction (a tweet or a retweet) among the considered two
classes of users.
On Twitter, users are strongly clustered in communities sharing similar ideas
(evidences of this, and discussions of its implications, can be found in many pa-
pers, see, e.g., [34–37]). Thus, if we consider two users showing a high number
of commonalities among their followers/followees, they probably have a similar
political affiliation. In order to infer directly from data the political orientation
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_immigration_to_Europe
4https://www.elastic.co
5In the following, we will often adopt the term ‘validated’, not to be confused with ‘verified’.
The former indicates a node that passes the filter of the projection procedure described in the
next sections; the latter refers to the aforementioned check by the platform on the identity of
an account.
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of users, after building the (indirect) bipartite network of verified/unverified
users, we project the bipartite network on the layer of the verified users (see
the Methods section) and consider the number of contacts shared by verified
accounts. The presence of a strong community structure in the bipartite net-
works of verified/unverified users has already been observed [33]; we repeat this
analysis here and check results on the layer of verified users, for which we have
reliable information. We confirm that also in the present case the result of [33]
holds, with some caveats, as we will see in the following.
2.2.1 Political affiliation
Figure 1: The network resulting from the projection procedure. In blue, ac-
counts tied to the Italian government5, to the right wing6, to Movimento 5
Stelle7 and the official account of the newspaper ‘Il Fatto Quotidiano’ with its
journalists [33]. In tomato red, the accounts of the Italian Democratic Party
(PD) and its representatives8, as well as some representatives of smaller parties
on the left of PD9. The purple group includes several NGOs10, politicians on
the left of PD11, different online and offline newspapers12. In orange, some of-
ficial accounts related to the Catholic Church13. Finally, in turquoise we found
smaller groups related to the Malta government (including the Prime Minister
Joseph Muscat and some of his ministers), and in green we even found a soccer
commentators community.
The bipartite network describing the interactions between verified and un-
verified users involves nearly one half of the unverified users in our dataset. This
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limited interaction differs from the one in [33], where almost all nodes were in-
volved in the polarization analysis. Nevertheless, even if here we have to restrict
our study to half of the accounts, the system still displays strongly structured
communities. In fact, the network obtained following the projection procedure
described in the Methods shows a strong community structure, see Figure 1.
To quantify the presence of clusters, we decide to use one of the most effective
and used community detection algorithms, that is the Louvain algorithm [38].
To avoid the problems related to the scale of applicability of such algorithm [39],
we apply the algorithm after reshuffling the order of nodes for N times (N being
the number of nodes in the network). The corrected algorithm returns 3 big
communities, see Figure 1: the description of the community by membership
can be found in the caption.
With respect to the previous study on the election campaign [33], here we
find several differences. While the M5S group and their supporters were distin-
guishable from the right wings during the election campaign, in the propaganda
regarding the Mediterranean migration it is not. Similarly, the left wing repre-
sentatives, both inside and outside the Democratic Party, are much closer than
during the election campaign. Smaller communities regards Malta prime Min-
ister Joseph Muscat and part of his ministers involved in the discussion for the
aid of migrants and castaways.
2.2.2 Polarization of unverified accounts
Verified accounts of politicians can be easily associated to membership of a
political party, for unverified users we assign membership by considering their
interactions with the community including the verified ones. We use the polar-
ization index ρi as defined in [40,41]:
ρi =
maxc∈C kci
ki
, (1)
5We find in this set the Minister for the Internal Affairs Matteo Salvini, the Minister of
Infrastructures and Transports Danilo Toninelli, the Minister of Health Giulia Grillo.
6The right wing verified accounts include the right party Fratelli d’Italia and its leader
Giorgia Meloni, Forza Italia and some of its representatives as Giovanni Toti, as well as Lega
with other politicians than the above mentioned Salvini.
7For instance, Carlo Sibilia and Roberta Lombardi can be found here.
8The candidates to the PD primary elections Nicola Zingaretti, Maurizio Martina and
Roberto Giachetti, its previous leader Matteo Renzi and the previous Prime Minister Paolo
Gentiloni contribute to this community.
9For example, Pierluigi Bersani, Laura Boldrini and Marco Furfaro are in this group.
10In the NGOs set we identified the Italian chapters of ActionAid, Medecins Sans Frontieres,
Unicef, Amnesty International, OpenArms.
11Giuseppe Civati, Nichi Vendola, Luigi De Magistris and Enrico Rossi are part of this set.
12A variety of accounts can be found in this set: Repubblica, il Post, Internazionale, la
Valigia Blu, Rolling Stone Italia and their journalists, many public figures as the film directors
Gabriele Muccino and Ferzan Ozpetek, the actors Alessandro Gassmann and Pif, the singers
Fiorella Mannoia, Nina Zilli, Frankie Hi-NRG
13The newspaper ‘l’Osservatore Romano’ and the website ‘Vatican News’ and ‘Vatican Ra-
dio’ are part of this group.
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where ki is the degree of node i, k
c
i is the number of links towards the community
c and C is the set of communities. The distribution of ρi is extremely peaked on
values close to 1, see Figure 2, right panel. Given such a strong polarization, we
can safely assign unverified users the polarization of the community they mostly
interact with.
Figure 2: Left panel: biadjacency matrix, describing the interactions between
verified and unverified users. Nodes have been rearranged in order to highlight
the community structure and colored according to the communities of Figure 1.
In gray, users with lower value of polarization or not projected by the validated
projection (see Methods and Supplementary Materials). Right panel: polariza-
tion index distribution among unverified users. The plot is in log-log scale, i.e.,
nodes with a polarization higher than 0.9 are more than 10 times the one of
those with polarization between 0.8 and 0.9.
We also find a smaller amount (with respect to the size of verified-unverified
network) of unverified nodes whose polarization is not strong enough to be
uniquely assigned to a specific cluster: they are part of the gray group in Fig-
ure 2.
As noted above, almost one half of the unverified users do not enter into this
polarization procedure, not interacting in the whole period with a single verified
user. This may be due to several reasons. Differently from [33], where a corpus
of tweets exchanged during the election campaign was analyzed, here we focus
on a set of tweets concerned with a specific topic of the political propaganda. We
conjecture that the amount of unverified accounts interacting with the verified
ones in the former case was much higher because it was of interest of the verified
accounts (mostly, candidates in the elections) to involve ‘standard’ users.
In order to know more about those unverified users not directly interacting
with the verified ones, we introduced a contagion of polarization. Unverified
users do indeed interact with each other and therefore, if the majority of their
(unverified) interacting partners is polarized, then we can use this fact to infer
the polarization of the users.We can iteratively assign to unverified users the
prevailing polarization of the other accounts they interact with and stop when
there is no possibility to assign a polarization anymore, i.e., if there is no clear
agreement among the neighbours of the considered node. In this way, after 10
rounds of such a procedure, we are able to increase the fraction of the users for
7
which we determine a clear political membership by 27%. Even if this percentage
may seem quite small, we will see that the aforementioned contagion process
is more effective on the set of validated accounts, presented in the following
sections. In this latter case, the increase of polarized users is almost 58%;
more details can be found in the Supplementary Materials. In the plots in
the following sections, the community colors are those obtained by relying on
polarization by contagion.
Interestingly enough, assigning a polarization to bots is much harder than
to average users: Figure 3 illustrates the density of all users (left panel) and
bots (right panel) in the 4 biggest communities and shows that it is much more
difficult to assign a polarization to bots. Neglecting the contribution of the gray
bars, the relative fractions of the different communities are more or less similar,
but for a slight increase of the abundance of ‘purple’ bots.
Figure 3: Left panel: the histogram of the 4 main communities for polarization
of all users after the iterative polarization. Nodes have been colored according
to the partition in Figure 1. In gray, users which cannot be assigned uniquely
to one community. Right panel: the same histogram for bots, as recognized by
the bot detector. Percentages of the different non-gray groups are lower than
the analogous for all users, but for the purple community. The (relative) extra
density of bots in the purple community may be due to the high presence of
automated news spreaders, used for increasing the visibility of the articles of
the newspapers accounts.
2.3 The backbone of the content exchange on Twitter
In the analysis of a complex system, one of the main issues is to skim the
relevant information from the noise. Of course, the definition itself of noise
depends on the system. In the present study, via the use of an entropy-based
null model [23,24,30–32], we filter the total exchange of content in our dataset,
discounting the information regarding the activity of users and the virality of
messages. Literally, we start by considering the directed bipartite network of
users (on one layer) and tweets (on the other layer): arrows are directed from the
user to the tweet in the case the user is the author of the message, while in the
opposite direction indicates that the user retweets the given message. We then
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construct the Bipartite Directed Configuration Model [42], i.e., the extension of
the standard framework of entropy-based configuration model [23,24,30–32] for
bipartite directed networks. In the present case, the constraints are represented
by the node activity, i.e., the number of original tweets posted by every user, the
number of retweets of every message and the number of retweets of every user.
Thus, by comparing the real system with the null-model, we can highlight all
the contributions that cannot be explained only by the fixed constraints. More
details can be found in the Methods section and in the Supplementary Materials.
As in the case of the polarization above, we can thus filter the flow of in-
formation on the network from the random noise due to the activity of users
and to the virality of tweets. The filtering returns a directed network in which
the arrows go from the authors to the retwetters and it reduces the number of
nodes to 14,883 users and of links to 34,302.
Figure 4: The directed validated network. Nodes have been colored according
to the partition in Figure 1. The dimension of each node is proportional to its
hub score: the biggest node (in blue) is the account of Matteo Salvini.
On top of this, we analyze the presence of automated accounts, by using
the bot detection method described in the Methods. The incidence of bots
on the number of nodes is about 2.5%, against almost the 7% of nodes in
the original network. The number of loops, i.e., users that retweet their own
posts, (significantly with respect to their activity), is circa the 1.2% over the
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total amount of links, thus relatively high. This effect reverberates also on the
number of validated nodes, that significantly retweet themselves (little less than
the 3%). For the subsequent analysis, we discard the contribution of loops, since
we are interested in analysing the source of the shared contents on Twitter.
2.3.1 Hubs and bots
As mentioned in the previous section, the validated links go from the authors
to the retwitters. In this sense, the effectiveness of an author can be derived
by its ability to reach a high number of most relevant nodes: this principle
is finely implemented in the Hubs-Authorities algorithm [43–45]. Authorities,
in this analysis, are sort of the sink of the content exchange. Since, in the
present system, the strongest authorities are represented by unverified accounts,
it is quite difficult to interpret the results. In the following, we focus on hubs,
because they represent the driving force of the discussion and are relatively
popular users; thus even if they are not verified by Twitter, we often have
reliable information about their accounts.
Figure 5: Left panel: the histogram of the 4 main communities for polarization
of all users in the validated network after the iterative polarization. Nodes
have been colored according to the partition in Figure 1. Right panel: the
same histogram for bots in the validated network. By comparing the present
histograms with those of Figure 3, it can be seen that, in this case, the number
of validated accounts for which the polarization procedure is not able to produce
a unique output is much smaller. Indeed, most of the unpolarized accounts do
not contribute significantly to contents exchange in the validated network.
Table 2 shows the values for the top 20 nodes, in term of hub scores. The
first account is the one of the Italian Minister of Internal Affairs Mr. Matteo
Salvini. The second and the third ones refer to two journalists of a news website
supported by Casa Pound, a neo-fascism Italian party. The fourth is the account
of Ms. Giorgia Meloni, leader of the right political party Fratelli d’Italia, former
ally during 2018 Italian political elections of the Lega, the political party of Mr.
Salvini. The political vision of the two leaders is quite close regarding the theme
of ruling the Mediterranean migration. The two accounts following in the rank
are respectively a journalist of ‘Il Fatto Quotidiano’ (newspaper supported by
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Screen name Hubscore k
out
i
|boti|
kouti
|boti|
kouti
/ |bot|
Nvalidated users
‘matteosalvinimi’ 1.000 3473 0.023 1.058
‘hub 1’ 0.490 1270 0.003 0.141
‘hub 2’ 0.465 1199 0.004 0.187
‘GiorgiaMeloni’ 0.427 1303 0.032 1.444
‘hub 4’ 0.395 1040 0.005 0.215
‘hub 5’ 0.326 809 0.011 0.498
‘hub 6’ 0.300 775 0.009 0.404
‘hub 7’ 0.290 574 0.002 0.078
‘hub 8’ 0.282 583 0.0 0.0
‘hub 9’ 0.271 646 0.003 0.139
‘hub 10’ 0.200 395 0.005 0.227
‘hub 11’ 0.189 368 0.0 0.0
‘hub 12’ 0.186 401 0.005 0.224
‘hub 13’ 0.166 341 0.009 0.394
‘hub 14’ 0.152 268 0.0 0.0
‘hub 15’ 0.133 245 0.012 0.549
‘hub 16’ 0.128 222 0.0 0.0
‘hub 17’ 0.126 299 0.013 0.600
‘hub 18’ 0.112 190 0.0 0.0
‘hub 19’ 0.106 279 0.011 0.482
Table 2: Screen names of the hubs in the validated network, their hub score,
their out-degree kout, the fraction of bots in their out-neighbours (indicated as
|boti|
kouti
and the ratio between this value and the average over the entire network
(indicated as |boti|
kouti
/
|bot|
Nvalidated users
). For the sake of privacy, the screen names of
the unverified accounts have been anonymized.
M5S) and an unverified user with opinions in line with the ones of the two above
mentioned politicians. All the accounts in Table 2 belong to the blue community.
The first account with a different membership (‘TgLa7’, a popular newscast by
a private TV channel, in the purple community in our analysis) ranks 176th with
respect to the hub score. It is striking the case of the Italian chapter of a NGO
assisting migrants in the Mediterranean Sea: while it has the fifth highest value
of out-degree (kout = 1104), it has an extra low hub score (4 × 10−4), ranking
452nd. It is even more impressive, considering that, in several occasions, the
Italian government (in the figure of the Minister of Internal Affair, mostly) and
the NGO have been opponents regarding the disembarkation of the migrants
rescued during the NGO activities.
Remarkably, we observe a non zero overlap among the bots in the list of
the validated followers of human users. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first time that such a phenomenon is detected. The presence of bot squads,
retweetting the messages of two or more strong hubs, increases the visibility of
11
Figure 6: The relative overlap matrix among list of bots following the different
hubs. Using the formalism of the previous Table 2, the generic matrix entry
represents
|boti∩botj |
|boti| . There are 12 accounts sharing a relatively high number
of bots.
their tweets.
We detect two main groups of such accounts, the other being composed by
a maximum of 2 common bots. The first one includes 22 genuine accounts
(9 of which are in the top 10 hubs), sharing 22 bots. In this set, some users
share a relatively high fraction of bots: there is the case of a right wing account
sharing all his automated followers with both Meloni and Salvini, see Figure 6.
In Figures 7 and 8, we represent two subgraphs of the original validated network
of Figure 4. Figure 7 shows the first group of genuine accounts sharing bots and
all their bot followers. The hub scores, represented as the dimensions of the
nodes, are nearly homogeneous among the hubs. This does not happen in the
12
Figure 7: The subgraph of the greatest group of users sharing bots. The sub-
graph includes human accounts (in dark blue) and all the bots following them
(in light red). The dimension of the nodes is proportional to the hub scores,
but normalised on the subgraph. The biggest node represents the account of
Mr. Salvini. In the picture, there are 22 bots shared by 22 humans. Among
the latter, 9 accounts are in the list of top 10 hubs. The subgraph contains 172
nodes. Notably, accounts belongs almost exclusively to the blue community.
analogous subgraph for the second group (see Figure 8): beside the presence of
a strong hub, the hub score distribution is much skewer than for the previous
group. Moreover, in absolute terms, the hub scores are much smaller than the
previous case, since the strongest hub is the aforementioned account of ‘TgLa7’
newscast. More details about the composition and the features of the two groups
can be found in the caption of Figures 7 and 8.
3 Discussion
The 2018 Eurobarometer report on news consumption presents a clear increasing
trend of popularity of online sources with respect to traditional ones [46]. Albeit
this widespread favour, online media are not trusted as their offline counterparts:
in a survey conducted in autumn 2017, 59% of respondents said they trusted
radio content, while only 20% said they trusted information available on online
social networks. Even beside the perception of common users, the presence
13
Figure 8: The subgraph of the second greatest group of users sharing bots.
Subgraphs include human accounts (in violet) and all the bots following them
(in light red). The dimensions of the bots are proportional to the hub scores,
but normalised on the subgraph. Thus, the dimension of the greatest node in
Figure 7 should be 362 times bigger than the greatest one here. The impact
on the validated network of the nodes in this graph is much more limited:
the strongest hub, i.e., the biggest node in the plot, is the official account of
‘TgLa7’, a newscast ranking 176th in the hub scores. Considering even the non
shared bots, the subgraph contains 58 nodes. Notably, accounts belongs almost
exclusively to the purple community.
of fake contents has indeed been revealed in several research work, both at
level of news per se and of fake accounts contributing to spreading them, see,
e.g., [7, 13,20,35,47].
Among different platforms, Twitter is one of the most studied, due to the
openness of its data through the public APIs. Also, it is strongly used for
political propaganda: a recent survey [48] showed that Italian journalists appear
on Twitter much more frequently than common users. Therefore, Twitter has
been used for many analyses of communication in the political propaganda,
see, e.g., [4, 7, 8, 22, 33, 34, 49–56]. Obviously, a major issue when performing
such kind of analyses is the reliability of the results, which is closely connected
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to the reliability of the users in the game: in such sense, a rich stream of
research is devoted to find powerful means for detecting automated accounts -
even anticipating their future evolution [57] - and their interactions with human-
operated accounts [8, 22,58].
Remarkably, all the previous analyses rarely tackle the effect of random
noise, which is indeed of utmost importance when studying complex systems.
In [59], Jaynes showed how Statistical Physics could be derived from Information
Theory from an entropy maximization principle. Following Jaynes work, in
recent years the same approach has been extended to complex networks [23,
24, 30–32], to provide an unbiased benchmark for the analysis, by filtering out
random noise. Such a framework proved to be extremely ductile and adaptable
to the description of different phenomena [42, 60–63]. In the present study, we
merge the application of bot detection techniques with the use of an entropy-
based null-model for the analysis of the content exchange on Twitter in the
Italian discussions about regulating the migration flux from Northern Africa.
The corpus we analyzed resulted to be extremely informative in highlighting
some otherwise hidden features of the dissemination of information in those
discussions.
First, in order to get the political affiliation of users, we focused on the bi-
partite network in which the two layers represent verified and unverified users,
respectively, and the (undirected) links label the interactions between the two
classes. The main idea is to infer the inclination of users towards a political point
of view from (a proxy of) their contacts: if two users share a great amount of
followers and followees, they probably have a similar political polarization. Fol-
lowing the strategy of [27], we use the above mentioned entropy-based framework
to project the bipartite network on the layer of verified users, whose account
information is reliable. Verified users have been clustered into 3 main groups,
see Figure 1: one group includes government representatives, the right wing and
the Movimento 5 Stelle party; a second group includes the Italian Democratic
party; a third one includes NGOs, online and offline media, journalists and some
VIPs. Confirming results presented in other studies [34, 35, 64, 65], the polar-
ization of unverified users is particularly strong: they interact quite exclusively
with accounts of a single community, see Figure 2. Differently than in other
studies [33], the interaction of unverified users with verified ones is limited, and
affects only one half of the total amount of unverified users. This is probably
due to the fact that we focus on a discussion that is wider than an election
campaign and that could stimulate exchanges between users who do not usually
participate in political discussions. Thus, we iteratively assign group member-
ships to unverified users, based on the political affiliation of the majority of
all their followers and followees. This procedure reduces the number of unpo-
larized accounts of more than 35%. Curiously, the ratio of bot accounts that
remain unpolarized after the ‘political contagion’ is higher than the analogous
for all users, see Figure 3. In any case, in the following, we will see that users,
automated or not, taking effectively part to the discussion are mostly polarized.
Finally, we extract the non trivial content exchange by adopting the vali-
dated projection developed in [33]: this permits to detect the significant flow of
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messages among users, discounting, at the same time, the virality of messages,
the retweetting activity of users and their productivity in writing tweets. Such
an approach provides the ‘backbone’ of the content exchange among users on
Twitter.
The network represented in Figure 4 is extremely informative for different
reasons. The validated network contains only 14,883 validated users out of the
127,275 users in the dataset. This highlights the fact that just a minority of
all users effectively contributes to the online propaganda on the migration flow.
Interestingly, we found that the incidence of bots on the validated network is
almost one third of the analogous measure on the entire dataset, signaling that
the number of bots whose retweets are non compatible with a random activity
is just a small minority. Since the target of a social bot is to increase audience
of the online content of a specific user, such a reduction shows that the number
of bots affecting significantly the political discussion is limited.
The set of validated users is much more polarized than the whole set of
users, see Figure 5. We have that the overall fraction of unpolarized accounts
represents more than 40% of all the accounts and more than 50% of the au-
tomated ones, while when considering the validated network, the same ratio is
around 10% for the former and around 5% for the latter. Otherwise stated, the
polarized bots pass the validation process more easily than their unpolarized
counterparts and their contribution in spreading messages is more significant.
All the accounts that are mostly effective in delivering their messages (i.e.,
the Hubs [43]) refer to the blue area in Figure 4, where we can find represen-
tatives of the the government in charge and the right wing. The first account
referring to a community different from the blue one is the official account of
the newscast ‘TgLa7’, at position 176th in the hub ranking.
The contribution of bots to the visibility of the various accounts shows that
the fraction of bots that significantly retweet the content of two right wing
political leaders (Mr. Salvini and Ms. Meloni) is greater than the incidence of
bots in the validated network. Interestingly enough, other hubs show a smaller
presence of bots among their followers, even if their hub score is not that different
from the two political leaders.
Finally, we have that some hubs do share their bots: Figure 6 describes the
normalized overlap between the list of bots of each pair of users in the list of
the top 20 hubs. As mentioned before, those accounts are from the right wing
political area. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that such a
behaviour is reported: in analyses tackling the same problem [8,11,22], only star-
like sub-graphs were observed, with a big number of bots among the followers of
a (presumably) human user. We underline that the considered shared bots are
particularly effective, since they are validated by the entropy-based projection.
Actually, the group of “right wing” bots, each supporting more than a human
account, is not the only one in the set, but it is the greatest: if we consider the
subgraphs of human accounts sharing their bots - see Figures 7, 8 -, the former
has 172 nodes against 58 of the latter. Moreover the first subgraph is by far
more efficient; indeed, in the second one the greatest hub score ranks 176th.
It is well known that bots aim at increasing popularity of users by retweetting
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their messages, see, e.g., [12]: exactly what is revealed by the entropy-based
filtering. The latter turns out to be extremely helpful, since it hits one feature
of an automated account that cannot be avoided by programmers. To the best of
our knowledge, the study here presented is the first investigation that merges bot
detection and entropy-based analysis of Twitter traffic. Moreover, the obtained
results are in line with the previous work of [7], where the authors showed how
bots massively support the spread of (low credibility) content. At the same
time, the present outcome contributes in a different way, being not specifically
focused on fake news, whereas [7] concentrates on the way fake news become
viral. Interestingly enough, among the many studies of the 2016 US presidential
election, Grinberg et al. [9] analyzed the proliferation of fake news on Twitter
and determined both fake news spreaders and exposed users. Remarkably, it
was found that fake news was ‘most concentrated among conservative voters’.
The role of bots in effectively conveying a message - for the first time here
highlighted even in a ‘shared fashion’ - and the spreading of fake news in online
discussions of great importance [7, 9] leads us to a promising future direction
of study, which include a deeper analysis of the exchanged messages, like the
extraction of their sentiment and the contained mentions.
4 Methods
4.1 Bot detection classifier
To assess the nature of the accounts in the dataset about migration from North-
ern Africa, we rely on a slightly modified version of the supervised classification
model proposed in [13].
In that work, a series of machine learning algorithms were originally trained
on a baseline dataset of genuine and fake accounts. The latter were bought on
three different Twitter accounts online markets, while the former were certified
as genuine by tech-savvy social media analysts.
The features and rules tested for the classification were among the most
relevant ones proposed by Academia for anomalous Twitter accounts detection.
Looking at the performances of the various algorithms on the training dataset,
the final result was a novel classifier, 1) general enough to thwart overfitting
(i.e., the problem of being too specialized on the training dataset and unable to
generalize the classification to new data), 2) lightweight, thanks to the usage of
features that require only information present in the profile of the account and
3) able to correctly classify more than 95% of the training data.
For the present paper, we reconstruct the model of the classifier in [13] and
we test its performances with J48, the Weka6 implementation of C4.5 algorithm,
on the same training set7, obtaining the same classification performance results.
The used features are listed in Table 3.
6https://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
7Dataset publicly available at http://mib.projects.iit.cnr.it/dataset.html
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Features
friends count
followers count
tweets count
friends
followers2
account age
following rate (approximated as friendsage )
the account’s profile has a name
the account’s profile has an image
the account’s profile has an address
the account’s profile has a biography
the account’s profile has a URL
the account belongs to a list
2× followers ≥ friends
100× friends ≥ followers
50× friends ≥ followers
Table 3: Features adopted for the fake account detector designed in [13] and
here re-constructed.
4.2 Validated projection of the bipartite network and users
polarization
Because of the official certification released by Twitter about the authenticity of
an account, users can be divided into two sets, the verified and unverified ones.
In [33], by implementing the method of [66], the authors used this feature to infer
the accounts’ inclination towards a specific political area, directly from data.
The underlying idea is that unverified users follow and interact with verified
users sharing their political ideals. In this sense, if two verified users have a
high number of common followers and followees, they probably have a similar
political affiliation. The a posteriori analysis of the results of the validated
projection confirms the previous hypothesis. Due to the Twitter verification
procedure, only the information provided by verified users is fact-checkable,
thus our check is restricted to this class of users.
We have to pay attention to the contribution of remarkably active users. If
a verified user is extremely engaged in the political propaganda, it may interact
with a huge number of unverified ones and may thus share a great amount of
contacts with almost all other verified users, even those with an opposite political
inclination. In this case, the contribution should be considered spurious, being
just due to fame of the user. Analogously, the role of an unverified user that
retweets all messages from her/his contacts should be discounted.
We obtain the political affiliation of the accounts by considering the undi-
rected bipartite network of interactions (i.e., retweets) between verified and un-
verified users, aggregated over the whole period: we disregard the information
about the direction of the interactions, since we are just interested in groups of
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users sharing contents. The previous intuition leads to comparing the overlap
of connections (literally, the number of common followers and followees) in the
real network with the expectations of a null-model able to account for the de-
gree sequence of both layers. In this way, we are able to discount the random
noise due to the activity of users and get the significant information from the
data. The entropy-based Bipartite Configuration Model (BiCM, [66]) provides
the correct benchmark for this analysis. While we describe more extensively
the theoretical construction in the Supplementary Materials, here we outline
introduce the main intuitions behind the Bipartite Configuration Model and its
monopartite validated projection.
4.2.1 The Bipartite Configuration Model
Let us start from a (real) bipartite network and call the two layers L and Γ
and their dimension respectively NL and NΓ; we label the nodes on those layers
respectively with Latin and Greek indices. We represent the connection via the
biadjacency matrix, i.e. the rectangular (NL × NΓ)-matrix M whose generic
entry miα is 1 if there is a link connecting node i ∈ L and node α ∈ Γ, and 0
otherwise. We then consider the ensemble GBi of all possible graphs with the
same number of nodes on the two layers as the real network. If we assign a
(formal) probability per graph, we can maximize the (Shannon) entropy,
S = −
∑
GBi∈GBi
P (GBi) lnP (GBi),
constraining the average value of some quantities of interest on the entire en-
semble. If, as it is the case of the present article, we impose the ensemble to have
fixed average for the number of links per node (i.e. the degree), the probability
per graph factorizes in independent probabilities per link:
piα =
xiyα
1 + xiyα
, (2)
where piα is the probability of finding a link between i and α and xi and yα (the
fitnesses [67]) are quantities defined per node that encode the attitude of the
nodes to form links [30]. At this level, the previous definition is formal, since
we just imposed that the average (over the ensemble) of the degree sequence to
be fixed, but we did not decide its value. It can be shown (see the Supplemen-
tary Materials) that maximizing the likelihood of the real network is equivalent
to fixing the average of the degree sequence to the one measured on the real
network [31,32].
4.2.2 Monopartite validated projection
We can now highlight all contributions that cannot be related to the degree
sequence only, comparing the real network with the expectations of the BiCM.
Following this line, in [66] a validated projection was proposed on top of the
BiCM. The main idea is to consider the common links of two nodes on the
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same layer and compare it with the theoretical distribution of the BiCM: if the
real system shows a commonality of links that cannot be explained only by the
activity of the users and we project a link between the nodes under analysis.
Using the formalism of [62], we call V-motif the overlap.
In formulas, by using the independence of probabilities per graph (2), the
probability that both node i and j link the same node α is simply
p(V ijα ) = piαpjα,
where V ijα is the above mentioned V-motif among i, j and α. The total overlap
between i and j is simply V ij =
∑
α V
ij
α and, according to the BiCM, is dis-
tributed as a Poisson-binomial, i.e. the extension of a binomial distribution in
which all the events have a different probability [68]. We can further associate
p-values to the observed V-motifs, i.e. the probabilities of finding a number of
V-motifs greater or equal to the one measured on the real network. In order to
state the statistical significance of several p-values at the same time, we relied
on a multiple test hypothesis and FDR [69] is generally considered the most
effective one since it permits to control the number of false negatives, with-
out being too conservative. The result of the projection is a binary undirected
monopartite network of nodes from the same layer, that are linked if their simi-
larity cannot be explained only by their degree. We therefore apply the Louvain
community detection algorithm [38] to identify different groups of nodes with
similar behaviours in the bipartite network. Since this method is known to be
order dependent [39], we apply it several times after reshuffling the node order
and take the maximum value of the modularity, i.e. the algorithm objective
function [39].
4.3 Extraction of the backbone of the traffic activity on
Twitter
In studying the exchange of contents we are interested in the flow that cannot
be related by the random activity. Differently from other analogous studies [4,8,
22,49], we consider also the virality of tweets, like in [33]. Methodologically, the
approach is similar to the one described in the previous section for the extraction
of the membership of users, but for substituting the BiCM with its analogous
directed version, the Bipartite Directed Configuration Model (BiDCM, [42]) and
for considering different layers of different kind: while in the section above the
layers represent verified and unverified users, here they represent users (both
verified and not) and tweets. The validated projection procedure returns a
directed monopartite network of significant exchange of messages, in which the
arrow goes from the author to the retweeters. Additional details about this
procedure can be found in the Supplementary Materials.
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A Entropy-based null-models
A.1 The Bipartite Configuration Model
In the present section, we outline the procedure to obtain the probability per
link of the Bipartite Configuration Model (BiCM, [62]), i.e., the extension of
the entropy-based null-models to bipartite networks [23,24].
Let us start with a real bipartite network in which we label the two layers
with L and Γ. We will refer to NL and NΓ, respectively, for the dimensions of
the two layers; nodes on the two layers are indicated respectively with i and
α. A bipartite undirected network can be described in terms of a biadjacency
matrix, i.e., a NL×NΓ matrix M whose generic entry miα is 1 if a link connects
the node i ∈ L to the node α ∈ Γ and 0 otherwise. The degree of a generic node
i ∈ L, i.e., the number of links of i, can be expressed as ki =
∑
α∈Γmiα; the
analogous for a generic α ∈ Γ is kα =
∑
i∈Lmiα.
Let us define GBi the ensemble of all possible graphs with the same number
of nodes per layer as in the real network. We label with an asterisk ∗ all the
quantities of the real network, but for NL and NΓ, since they are going to be
fixed on the entire ensemble. If every graph GBi ∈ GBi is equipped with a
probability P (GBi), we can define the Shannon entropy for the ensemble as
S = −
∑
GBi∈GBi
P (GBi) lnP (GBi).
S represents the uncertainty we have over the system and we aim at maximising
it in order to be as general as possible. However, we discount some information
about the system, thus maximising our uncertainty but for some quantities
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that we want to conserve over the ensemble. This goal can be obtained by
maximising the Shannon entropy, constrained such that the average values of
some quantities of interest are fixed. If the constraints are expressed as a vector
~C(GBi) it can be shown that the probability per graph reads [30]:
P (GBi) ∼ e−~θ·~C(GBi),
where ~C(GBi) is the vector of the constraints evaluated on the graph GBi and
~θ is the vector of the relative Lagrangian multipliers [30]. If we constrain the
value of the degree sequence, i.e., all ki’s and kα’s, it can be shown that the
probability per graph factorises in independent probabilities per link:
P (GBi|~x, ~y) =
∏
i∈L
∏
α∈Γ
paiαiα (1− piα)1−aiα ,
where
piα =
xiyα
1 + xiyα
. (3)
If ~θ and ~η are the Lagrangian multipliers of the degree sequences of the L and
Γ layers, xi = e
−θi and yα = e−ηα . xi and yα are called fitnesses. Fitnesses
encode the attitude, respectively of nodes i and α, to establish links [67].
Equation (3) is formal: so far, we just impose that, over the ensemble, the
average of the degree sequence must be fixed. In order to ‘tailor’ the ensemble
on the real network, we have to impose that the average degree sequence is the
one measured on the real network [31,32], i.e.,{ 〈ki〉 = ∑α piα = k∗i
〈kα〉 =
∑
i piα = k
∗
α
. (4)
In this way, we have an ensemble of networks to compare our results with,
showing exactly the same degree sequence, but being as general as possible
regarding all the other features.
The solution of System (4) can only be numerical, since no analytic form can
be found. Due to the dimensions of the system under analysis, we approximate
the probability per link as piα ' xiyα; the approximation is justified as long as
the network is sparse, in particular when xi, yα  1. In such a case, the null
model is analogous to the one of [70] and the solution of System (4) is analytic:
pCLAiα =
k∗i k
∗
α
m∗
, (5)
where m∗ is the total number of links measured on the real network and “CLA”
stays for “Chung-Lu Approximation”.
A.1.1 Validated monopartite projection
We can make use of the BiCM in order to project the information contained
in the original network, discounted by the degree sequence contribution. The
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main idea was developed in [66]: due to the independence of the probabilities
per link, the probability that both nodes i, j ∈ L are connected to node α ∈ Γ
is
P (V ijα ) = piαpjα,
where V ijα is the event of i and j linking α: such a pattern was described in [62]
as a V -motif since, if the two layers are represented as two horizontal lines
of vertices, it draws a “V” between the layers. More formally, they are K2,1
stars [71]. If we are interested in how much similar two nodes are in terms of
common connections, we can compare the number of common links in the real
network (V ij)∗ =
∑
α∈Γ(V
ij
α )
∗ with its theoretical distribution, according to the
BiCM. Since all the probabilities P (V ijα ) are different -in general- the theoretical
probability distribution is a Poisson-binomial [68,72,73], i.e., the extension of a
Binomial distribution in which every Bernoulli event has a different probability.
If the probabilities per V−motif are particularly low (as it is the case of the
present study), the Poisson-binomial distribution can be approximated with a
Poisson distribution [68], in which the parameter is
λ = 〈V ij〉 =
∑
α∈Γ
piαpjα
CLA
=
k∗i k
∗
j
(m∗)2
∑
α∈Γ
(k∗α)
2,
where in the last step we implement the Chung-Lu approximation (5).
Once we have all the theoretical distributions, we can assign to every V ij
a p-value and then validate all the statistically significant ones. In the present
article, we set the statistical significant level α = 0.01 and implement the FDR
(False Discovery Rate, [69]) for the validation. FDR is one of the most effective
methods for multiple testing hypothesis, i.e., to claim the statistical significance
of many p-values at the same time, since it permits to control the number of
False Positives [69]. The procedure is pretty simple: once all N p-values are
ordered from the smallest to the greatest, i.e.,
p-value1 ≤ p-value2 ≤ · · · ≤ p-valueN ,
the effective statistical significance threshold is the greatest i αN satisfying
p-valuei ≤ i
α
N
.
A.2 The Bipartite Directed Configuration Model
As a side product of defining a monopartite Configuration Model with a commu-
nity structure, in [42] the directed extension of the BiCM was presented; here-
after, we are going to call it Bipartite Directed Configuration Model (BiDCM).
In the following, we will use the formalism of [33], since it is tailored on our
application. Thus, we will indicate the two layers as U (i.e., users) and P (i.e.,
posts), and NU and NP are, respectively, their dimensions. A bipartite directed
network can be described by using two NU ×NP biadjacency matrices, respec-
tively T (i.e., the tweets), indicating links going from U to P , and R (i.e.,
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retweets), indicating links from P to U . Considering the exchange of content in
the original network, we use the T matrix to describe the authorship of tweets,
while R is for retweets. If we focus on a generic user u, her/his out- and in-
degrees are respectively
κoutu =
∑
p∈P
tup; κ
in
u =
∑
p∈P
rup
The two quantities represent, respectively, the number of tweets the user u wrote
and the number of tweets u retwitted. Analogously, for the generic post p is
κinp =
∑
u∈U
tup = 1; κ
out
p =
∑
u∈U
rup.
As it can be seen in the previous definitions, we have a great simplification, due
to the nature of our system: since there can only be a single author for a given
post, the in-degree of a post is always 1, for every p. This feature is going to
introduce a great simplification in the following calculations.
By following the same track of the previous section, if we call the ensemble
of bipartite directed graphs GBiD, by maximising the entropy of the system
constraining the entire (directed) degree sequence, it can be shown that the
probability for a generic bipartite directed graph GBiD ∈ GBiD still factorises in
terms of probabilities per link [33,42]:
P (GBiD|~z, ~z′, ~ζ, ~ζ ′) =
∏
u∈U
∏
p∈P
qtupup (1−qup)1−tup ·
∏
u′∈U
∏
p′∈P
(qu′p′)
ru′p′ (1−qu′p′)1−ru′p′ ,
where
qup =
zuζp
1 + zuζp
; q′u′p′ =
z′u′ζ
′
p′
1 + z′u′ζ
′
p′
(6)
are respectively the probabilities of u being an author of the post p and of u′
being a retwitter of the post p′. Again, by maximising the likelihood of the
real systems, we have that, among the other conditions, 〈κinp 〉 = 1 ∀p ∈ P . The
previous condition implies that all the fitnesses ζ are equal for every node in P
and it can be shown that qup =
(κoutu )
∗
NP
∀p ∈ P [33].
A.2.1 Directed validated projection
In order to extract those relationships among users that cannot be simply re-
ferred to their activity and the virality of posts, we project the directed bipar-
tite network on the layer of users, following the same strategy of the validated
projection for undirected bipartite networks. Differently from the previous val-
idated projection, in the present case the final result is going to be a directed
monopartite network in which links flow from the significant source of post to
the significant retwitters.
In the present study, the approach is analogous to the one in [33], but for two
crucial differences. First, in [33] we analysed the contribution of retwitted posts
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only, while here we also consider the contribution of non-retwitted ones. This
choice affects only the probabilities q’s: the rationale is that we aim at detecting
if an account retweets all the posts of a certain user or it makes a selection on
the messages of the given author. Secondly, we not only limit the investigation
to the content flow, but also we explore the contribution of bot accounts to
that flow. In terms of message spreading, and linked to our exploration on the
activities, retwitting all the posts of a certain user is probably more critical than
selecting part of them.
We call Vuvp the event of v retwitting the post p written by u: according to
the BiDCM, its probability is simply
P (Vuvp ) = qupq′vp =
(κoutu )
∗
NP
q′vp (7)
As in the case of the undirected bipartite network, due to the dimension of the
system, we approximate the Poisson-binomial distribution of Vuv with a Poisson
distribution in which the parameter is
λ = 〈Vuv〉 =
∑
p∈P
P (Vuvp ) =
∑
p∈P
(κoutu )
∗
NP
q′vp =
(κoutu )
∗
NP
∑
p∈P
q′vp =
(κoutu )
∗(κinv )
∗
NP
,
where, in the last steps, we made use of equation (7). It is worth noting that,
with respect to the previous case, in the actual projected validation we do not
use the Chung-Lu approximation in order to simplify the calculations, but we
take advantage of the fact that any post has just one author.
Finally, we can associate to each observed Vuv a p-value via the previous
distributions and we validate them via the above mentioned FDR [69]; in the
present case too, the statistical significant level is set to α = 0.01.
B Iterative procedure for assigning a political
inclination to unverified users
As mentioned in the main text, just almost one half of the unverified users
interact with verified ones. Since this interaction is used to infer the inclination
of users towards a political point of view directly from data, we iteratively
extend the procedure for the inclination assignment. The idea is to consider all
the unpolarized users and assign them the inclination of the majority of their
followers and followees. If the polarization index ρ (as defined in (1) of the
main text) of a given unpolarized node is lower than 0.5, then the majority
of its neighbours is non polarized. Thus, the node re-enters the polarization
step, until no polarization can be assigned anymore. Noticeably, the previous
threshold -0.5- is particularly high, since we have identified 3 big communities.
The nodes resulting in grey in the first bipartite validation have been considered
in the contagion polarization too.
The algorithm stops after 10 steps, and we were able to assign a political
affiliation to almost the 27% of the unpolarized users, resulting in the 15% of
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the entire set of accounts. Even if the previous percentage seems quite small,
it is not when we focus on the nodes in the directed validated projection, as
it can be seen in Figure 5 of the main text. The amount of unpolarized users
represents the 8.3% of the total number of validated accounts. Literally, the
polarization by contagion was able to assign a polarization to almost the 58%
of unpolarized nodes in the directed projection.
C Alternative approaches to assign a political
inclination
The adoption of the validated projection approach for detecting the polarization
of the users may appear as unnecessarily complicated, with respect to launching
a community detection algorithm on the monopartite network of interactions
among all the accounts. However, the validation process removes random noise
from the system, thus providing a (validated) network in which the communities
are clearer. The monopartite network of undirected interactions can be found
in Figure 9: in the left panel, nodes have been colored according to the result of
the Louvain community detection algorithm; in the right panel, the communities
have been obtained by the (iterative) polarization described in the main text.
There are some similarities between the two partitions: the blue communities
almost overlap (but for some relevant differences that we are going to discuss in
the following). However, on the one hand, the left partition pinpoints a yellow
group (containing mostly M5S politicians and journalists); on the other hand,
the right partition reveals two main groups in the upper cluster, instead of the
single one on the left.
Figure 9: The undirected network of retweet interactions. Left panel: Nodes are
colored according to the reshuffled community detection on the network. Right
panel: Nodes are colored according to the iterative polarization assignment
described in the main text.
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At first glance, the two panels may seem more or less equivalent, but lit-
erally they are not. If we consider the affiliation of the various verified users,
the differences are somehow striking. Firstly, the pink community in the left
panel contains the verified accounts of both the red and the purple community
of the right panel, thus mixing the two groups. Secondly, the yellow community
in the left partition reveals a group that is not detected in the right one, i.e.,
the one of politicians and journalists supporting the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S)
party. However, this cluster also contains other newspapers far from M5S, as
‘La Stampa’, ‘Il Corriere della Sera’, ‘Il Sole24ore’, a gossip website (‘Dagospia’)
and some TV newscasts as ‘SkyNews 24’, ‘RaiNews’ and ‘Tg La7’. The blue
community in the left panel is quite similar to the one in the right panel, but for
the presence of some Democratic Party parliamentarians and for the absence
of Mr. Matteo Salvini. The latter fact is especially odd, since the two official
accounts of Lega, i.e., the political party of Mr. Salvini, are still in the blue
community. In the dark blue community of the left panel, absent in the right
panel, we find the account of Mr. Salvini, together with some French politicians
from the Rassemblement National, as well as some German politicians from the
Alternative fu¨r Deutschland. At a first sight, this sounds reliable, since Lega,
Rassemblement National, Alternative fu¨r Deutschland are allied in the Euro-
pean Parliament. Nevertheless, the presence of some parliamentarians of the
Italian Democratic Party weaken the reliability of such a cluster. Analogously,
the quite big green community in the left panel contains a pot-pourri of ac-
counts, like, e.g., the Italian embassy in Greece and the referees of a popular
Italian TV dance contest, ‘Ballando con le Stelle’.
We argue that the non validated partition, e.g., the one described in the left
panel, is reasonable, but the amount of noise is much higher with respect to
the validated one, i.e., a relatively high number of verified nodes has a clearly
wrong membership. In the validated projection, the number of evidently wrong
assignments is much lower, being limited to few center-left wing journalists in
the community of the right wing. Due to such a difference, in this paper we
have adopted the validated projection approach.
D Bot Squads
The analysis of the role of bots in the validated backbone of the traffic of mes-
sages on Twitter let us observe the presence of automated accounts that follow
more than one genuine user. We call such groups ‘bot squads’. Remarkably, we
find two groups of genuine users sharing more than 2 automated accounts. The
biggest users group includes 12 of the top 20 hubs (9 in the top 10). Referring
to Figure 7 in the main text, we detect the presence of a subgraph of 22 hubs
sharing 22 bots among their followers: literally, each of these 22 bots does not
retweet the content of a single hub, but of more than one user in the subgraph.
Thus, the bot squad increases the visibility of the common followees. Among
the hubs in the subgraph, we can find the account of the Minister of Internal
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Affairs Mr. Salvini, as well as the Minister of Infrastructures Danilo Toninelli.
Other verified accounts are the one of Giorgia Meloni of Fratelli d’Italia, a right
wing party, and the official accounts of Lega (Mr. Salvini’s party). In this set,
we find also the news website supported by Casa Pound, a neo-fascist Italian
party, two journalists from the same website, the director of the newspaper La
Verita`, as well as other politicians of the Lega party.
The Figure 8 in the main text shows the subgraph of the violet bot squad:
there, the genuine accounts are much less efficient in delivering their messages,
since the strongest hub, representing a popular newscast, ranks 176th in the
overall hub score. Moreover, while the blue subgraph included 178 nodes, the
violet one contains just 58 accounts.
In this subgraph, we find the presence of several NGOs, some NGO represen-
tatives (coming, for instance, from ‘Comunita` di Sant’Egidio’, a Catholic NGO,
and from MOAS, a NGO active in aiding migrants in the Mediterranean sea),
some journalists from the TV channel La7 and small political parties belonging
to the left wing.
The incidence of bots in the two subgraphs of Figures 7 and 8 in the main
text is relatively similar, being the 87% for the first subgraph and 79% for the
second one. Instead, the ratio between the members of the bot squads (i.e., the
number of shared bots) over the total number of genuine users in the subgraphs
is not: the former is exactly 1, while the latter is around 0.58. Interestingly, in
both sets, the hubs rarely retweet between each other in a significant way (in
fact, only 3 links can be found among them). They leave the duty of spreading
the content of the partners to the bots.
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